D.C. Circuit On Overuse Of Acronyms In Appellate Briefs

The Volokh Conspiracy has this post today by Jonathan Adler discussing a recent D.C. Circuit order that required the parties in a case to refile their briefs without extensive use of "uncommon acronyms." Here's an excerpt from a Judge Silberman concurrence in a different case, criticizing a party for its overuse of acronyms:

The use of obscure acronyms, sometimes those made up for a particular case, is an aggravating development of the last twenty years. Even with a glossary, a judge finds himself or herself constantly looking back to recall what an acronym means. Perhaps not surprisingly, we never see that in a brief filed by well-skilled appellate specialists. It has been almost a marker, dividing the better lawyers from the rest.

Delaware Riverkeeper Network v. FERC, No. 13-1015, slip op. at *1 (Silberman, J., concurring).

Judge Silberman also suggested that parties may be using these acronyms so heavily in order to come under the word limits. Id.

Of course, this was an admin case, where acronyms are frequent. The majority opinion itself makes frequent use of acronyms. Take, for instance, this sentence: "In 

preparing an EA or EIS, an agency need not foresee the 

unforeseeable, but . . . [r]easonable forecasting and 

speculation is . . . implicit in NEPA, and we must reject any attempt by agencies to shirk their responsibilities under NEPA by labeling any and all discussion of future environmental effects as ‘crystal ball inquiry.’" Id. at 8 (majority op.) (emphasis added). 

If the majority opinion was written like that, I shudder to think how much more acronym-ridden the briefs must have been to prompt a complaint from Judge Silberman.